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The airline industry was severely hit by the COVID-19 crisis with an average demand decrease of
about 64% (IATA, April 2020) which triggered already several bankruptcies of airline companies all
over the world. While the robustness of the world airline network (WAN) was mostly studied as an
homogeneous network, we introduce a new tool for analyzing the impact of a company failure: the
‘airline company network’ where two airlines are connected if they share at least one route segment.
Using this tool, we observe that the failure of companies well connected with others has the largest
impact on the connectivity of the WAN. We then explore how the global demand reduction affects
airlines differently, and provide an analysis of different scenarios if its stays low and does not come
back to its pre-crisis level. Using traffic data from the Official Aviation Guide (OAG) and simple
assumptions about customer’s airline choice strategies, we find that the local effective demand can
be much lower than the average one, especially for companies that are not monopolistic and share
their segments with larger companies. Even if the average demand comes back to 60% of the total
capacity, we find that between 46% and 59% of the companies could experience a reduction of more
than 50% of their traffic, depending on the type of competitive advantage that drives customer’s
airline choice. These results highlight how the complex competitive structure of the WAN weakens
its robustness when facing such a large crisis.
I. INTRODUCTION
We see only the beginning of the socio-economic im-
pact of the coronavirus pandemic (COVID-19) that
spread over the whole world in the first semester of 2020.
All sectors, agriculture, manufacturing industry, and of
course the tertiary sector will be strongly affected by
this crisis [1], and our way of life could deeply change.
In particular, the airline industry was severely hit with
many governments that enforced both domestic and in-
ternational travel restrictions at various degrees. Some
countries restricted the flights from severely affected ar-
eas while others even cancelled almost all flights. These
travel restrictions did delay or interrupt the further trans-
mission of the COVID-19 [2], but also caused great dam-
age to the world airline network (WAN) [3], the most
important travel network in today’s world and one of the
key infrastructures of today’s global economy.
More precisely, the COVID-19 outbreak caused a de-
cline from 44, 665 segments in the period 1-7 January
2020 to 24, 371 in the period 19-25 April 2020 (represent-
ing a decrease of 45.4%), thus impacting a large number
of companies. In order to visualize this variation, we
average over a 7-day time window the capacity (given
by the number of seats for all flights) for each com-
pany and plot the result on Fig. 1. In particular, we
show the capacity for the three biggest airline compa-
nies in China (Air China, China Southern Airlines and
China Eastern Airlines) and how their capacity dropped
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around the beginning of February. Many other airline
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Figure 1: Evolution of the capacity of various airline compa-
nies early 2020. We highlight several large companies. The
capacity of each company is averaged over every 7 days.
companies also faced the decrease of capacity later with
the epidemic spreading over the whole world, including
Lufthansa Cargo at the end of February and Delta Air-
lines, American Airlines, United Airlines Cargo and Air
France during the middle of March.
This is not the first time that the WAN suffered large-
scale disruptions. For example the eruption of the vol-
cano Eyjafjallajokull in 2010 not only threatened the
safety of local residents, but also seriously affected the air
traffic in Europe, by causing the cancellation of 108, 000
flights, disrupting the travel plans of 10.5 million passen-
gers and costing the airline industry in excess of $1.7 bil-
lion in lost revenue [4, 5]. There are, however, differences
with these rare events, which brought massive losses for
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2the air industry, and the current crisis. First, it remains
unclear how long this pandemic will last. Since effect of
high temperature and high humidity on COVID-19 seems
to be limited [6], most experts do not expect that the epi-
demic will naturally come to an end in the summer 2020.
As a consequence, governments may have to maintain the
travel restrictions, which is definitely a strike to the whole
air industry. Second, it remains unclear how the demand
will resume back to normal, if it does so. An analysis of
the Boston Consulting Group [7] proposed various sce-
narios for the evolution of the air travel demand, the
most probable one being a gradual recovery stretching
into 2021 (‘prolonged U-shape’). This is motivated by
the fact that international travel is discouraged and that
borders will slowly reopen leading to a slow return of the
consumer confidence. The economic recession and the
failure of travel distributors will enhance this drop of air
travel demand. This situation could thus last a while,
and has already provoked the bankruptcies of more than
20 airlines so far [8, 9] such as Air Italy (Italy), Flybe
(UK) which was the largest independent regional airline
in Europe, Trans States Airlines (US), Compass Airlines
(US), Virgin Australia (Australia), Avianca (Colombia),
etc. Other major airlines called for multibillion bailout
in order to survive [10].
There are of course different reasons why an airline
goes bankrupt [11], but it ultimately boils down to the
lack of cash to cover the airline’s liabilities. An impor-
tant ingredient is then the structure of the WAN and in
particular how the different airlines, which compose it,
are superimposed and interact with each other. Another
crucial ingredient is how customers will choose an airline
rather than another one, and it is in these extreme cases
that a competitive advantage will prove to be fundamen-
tal. In this work, we will address two aspects. First,
we will analyze the robustness of the WAN against the
bankruptcy of different airlines, and which failures are
the most dangerous for its connectivity. In this part we
will also study how the traffic can reorganize itself. In a
second part, we will consider how the global traffic de-
mand reduction will affect different airlines, and for this
we will test various strategies of how customers choose
their airline company. For these studies, we will use real
traffic data from the Official Aviation Guide (OAG) for
the WAN (see Material and Methods).
II. THE EFFECT OF BANKRUPTCIES ON THE
WORLD AIRLINE NETWORK
A. Robustness and the ‘airline company network’
Usually, the WAN is defined as the network composed
of nodes that are airports and links that represent direct
flights between two airports [12–14]. An obvious fact but
often ignored in many studies about the WAN is that
it results in fact from the superimposition of routes be-
longing to different airlines, leading to the well-known
emergent hub-and-spoke structure [15]. Each airline op-
timizes its own profit and the WAN can thus be seen
as the emerging network resulting from the choices of all
these operators. Despite this important aspect, the struc-
ture and the robustness of the WAN have mostly been
studied from a topological point of view, with a focus on
the effect on the giant connected component of node or
link removal [16–18]. However, as noted above, describ-
ing the WAN as a simple topological network might be
oversimplified, and in order to reach realistic conclusions,
it seems necessary to take into account other aspects of
this network (for a review and research agenda about
the robustness of this network, see [19]). In particular,
some works studied this important airline aspect, and
considered the WAN as a multilayer network where each
layer is a different airline company [14, 20–22]. We note
that in [22] the authors considered an interesting study
of re-scheduling of passengers after the failure of a given
segment.
Here, we will analyze the robustness of the WAN when
facing airline bankruptcies. This is different from the
usual robustness study where nodes/links are removed.
Instead, the removal of an airline implies the removal of
possibly many segments, and/or the decrease of capacity
if the segment is shared with another company, or the
complete removal of the link if the airline was the only
one operating on it. We first construct the WAN based
on the data provided by the OAG for the period 1st Jan-
uary - 25th April 2019 (see Material and Methods for
details). In order to analyze the robustness of this multi-
layer network from this point of view, we then construct
what we call here the ‘airline company network’ (ACN)
where nodes represent airline companies (the number of
nodes is here m = 849), and two nodes in this network
are connected if the corresponding companies share at
least a segment. Obviously, two airline companies can
share more than one segment and it is natural to define
the weight of a link in the ACN as the segment overlap
given by
Oij =

∑
`∈Li∩Lj
min{Ni(`), Nj(`)}
min{Ni, Nj} i 6= j
0 i = j
(1)
where Li is the set of segments operated by company i,
Ni(`) is the capacity of company i on segment ` (aver-
aged over T = 116 days) and Ni =
∑
`∈Li Ni(`) is the
total capacity of company i. This segment overlap cap-
tures the similarity between two airline companies and
its distribution is shown in Fig. S1 in the appendix. We
observe a wide range of this overlap and while most of
the companies do not share segments with each other,
nearly 100 pairs of companies display an overlap equal to
1, indicating that either one is included in the other, or
that they are proposing exactly the same set of segments
and are thus in direct competition.
The study of this weighted ACN allows us to have a
better view of how the different airlines interact with each
3other. In particular, it will help us to understand how
robust the WAN is when airlines are failing. In general,
when studying the robustness of the WAN, different link
or node removal strategies are adopted [16, 17]. Remov-
ing a link implies that all companies operating on this
segment stopped simultaneously, which is unlikely to oc-
cur in general, except in cases of airport closures which
happened for example during the eruption of the vol-
cano Eyjafjallajokull. Here, we will consider the specific
situation where many airlines can fail. The bankruptcy
of an airline does not imply, however, that one or more
segments in the WAN will disappear, but just that its
capacity will be reduced.
Based on the segment overlap, it is natural to define
the average segment overlap of a company with its ‘neigh-
bours’ as
Oi =
1
|Ci|
∑
j∈Ci
Oij , (2)
where Ci = {j | Oij > 0} is the set of companies sharing
at least one segment with company i and |Ci| represents
the number of corresponding companies. A large average
segment overlap indicates that the corresponding airline
company shares many segments with others and is thus
in direct competition with them. In contrast, a small
overlap indicates a company that operates alone on some
segments and does not suffer any competition there. It is
then tempting to think that the average segment overlap
can serve as an indicator for identifying ‘critical’ compa-
nies, whose bankruptcy will induce the isolation of cer-
tain airports and cities and cause a great damage to the
connectivity of the WAN.
Classically, when ignoring the structure in terms of air-
line companies, the most effective strategy to destroy the
connectivity of the WAN is to remove the most central
nodes (i.e. nodes with highest betweenness centrality,
see [16, 17]) or the links with the lowest traffic [18]. As
already mentioned above, these results do not provide
much information about the impact of airline bankrupt-
cies and the partial reduction in traffic capacity for cer-
tain segments. In order to test this influence, we first
consider the robustness of the WAN for four different
removal strategies: (i) random removal of airline com-
panies; (ii) removal of airline companies with the largest
passenger capacity Ni; (iii) removal of airline companies
with the largest betweenness centrality computed in the
weighted ACN; (iv) removal of airline companies with
the largest average segment overlap Oi. We note that
for strategy (iii), the calculation of the betweenness cen-
trality in the weighted ACN relies on the shortest path
between two nodes such that the sum of weights (here
the segment overlap Oij) is maximal among all connec-
tive paths. As most robustness analysis do, we choose
the size of the giant component (i.e. the connected sub-
graph with the largest number of nodes), as the measure
of the connectivity of the WAN.
We show in Fig. 2 the size of the giant component of
the WAN as a function of the fraction of the cumulative
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Figure 2: Size of the giant component of WAN as the func-
tion of the fraction of the cumulative passenger capacity of
removed companies. Five different removal strategies of air-
line companies are compared.
passenger capacity of removed companies (which implies
that the intervals along the x-axis between dots are not
uniform due to the diversity of the companies’ capaci-
ties). For the strategy (ii), where we remove companies
according to their passenger capacity (from the largest
to the smallest), the variation over the x-axis is large but
the impact on the WAN is small. Sorting and removing
companies according to their betweenness centrality in
the ACN is also not very effective. Compared to these
cases, removing airline companies in a random order has
actually a larger impact on the WAN structure. However,
we observe that the last strategy (iv) is very effective:
removing companies according to their integration with
other companies seems to have the largest impact on the
WAN’s connectivity, suggesting that crucial paths in the
WAN are shared by the same set of companies. More
generally, this is a sign that in order to understand the
robustness of the WAN and the impact of the failure of
an airline company, we need to take into account its in-
teraction with the other companies.
This discussion shows that not all airlines are equiva-
lent and that their bankruptcy can display a large variety
of consequences. In particular, the location of the airline
in the ACN, or in other words, how it is coupled to other
companies, seems to be a crucial ingredient for under-
standing the impact of its bankruptcy. This leads us to
quantify how much a company has the monopoly over its
different segments and we define the monopolistic index
as
Mi =
1
|Li|
∑
`∈Li
Ni(`)∑m
j=1Nj(`)
, (3)
where |Li| is the total number of segments serviced by
company i. This index is equal or close to 1 if most the
segments of company i are dominated by i. The distribu-
tion of Mi shown in Fig. 3 indicates that there is a large
variety of companies with various degree of monopoly,
demonstrating the large diversity of the airlines compa-
nies. The peak at M = 1 indicates that there are about
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Figure 3: Distribution of monopolistic index.
80 companies which are totally monopolistic: all their
segments are not shared with another company.
The importance of this feature can be checked with our
robustness test: we remove companies according to their
monopolistic index and obtain the result shown in Fig. 2.
The rapid decrease of the WAN connectivity with this
strategy confirms our conclusion about the importance
of airlines interactions for understanding the structure of
the WAN and its robustness.
B. Rerouting after bankruptcy
An important process not considered in the robustness
analysis above is the direct consequence on passengers of
an airline company bankruptcy. These passengers have
to be rerouted and need to choose flights of other com-
panies (when it is possible), putting extra stress on some
flights. In some cases even, the bankruptcy of companies
can isolate some cities leaving no other choices for the
passengers to find another transportation mode. In this
section, we will simulate this process for various level of
demand decrease, starting from the real data, in order
to understand the possible post-COVID-19 scenarios for
the WAN.
We denote by α ∈ [0, 1] the average demand/load ra-
tio for all flights. We consider here the uniform case (see
the next section for other assumptions), where the actual
number of passengers for airline company i on segment `
is then αNi(`), where the capacity is Ni(`). If the com-
pany i fails, its αNi(`) passengers have to be rerouted
for each of its segment `. We assume here that passen-
gers always choose the shortest path with less transfers
as possible. If for the segment `, there are other direct
flights provided by other companies, some lucky passen-
gers can take them (which will be possible with α < 1).
Once the flights of current shortest path are fully oc-
cupied, the rest of the passengers will be rerouted over
the second shortest path, and so on. If all the rerouted
passengers can reach their final destinations, we com-
pute the average number of additional transfers and the
average additional distance as the ‘cost’ of the airline’s
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Figure 4: Weighted average cost of transfers number due to
rerouting (with weight given by the capacity of companies).
bankruptcy. For example, if a passenger wanted to fly
from city a to b at first, now he/she has to transfer in
city k. In this case, his/her number of additional trans-
fers is 1 and the additional distance is (dak + dkb)− dab,
where dab is the distance between city a and b. In the
less favorable case where some passengers cannot reach
their destination which can happen if all flights are fully
booked, the WAN fails and we compute the number of
these stranded passengers.
We test the bankruptcy of each airline company in
the database, and use the rerouting process as described
above. We show in Fig. S2 the weighted average cost
of additional transfers with weight equal to the capac-
ity of companies not inducing stranded passengers (see
Fig. S2(a) for the additional distance). For a low global
demand, passengers can always be rerouted without too
many problems, but with increasing α, passengers need
to make always more transfers and at the cost of a larger
distance. We also consider the total number of passengers
stranded due to the bankruptcies of airlines if they cannot
be successfully rerouted (Fig. S2(b)). As an indication,
we fit the result with a power law function and obtain the
large exponent value of 3.75, indicating a rapid increase
with α of the number of stranded passengers: when α
is of the order of 0.5, there is a significative number of
stranded passengers of about 2.5 millions.
The existence of stranded passengers depends on a crit-
ical point of demand for each airline company (denoted
by αci for company i) above which its passengers can-
not transfer successfully after its bankruptcy, or in other
words: bankruptcy of company i leads to stranded pas-
sengers only for α > αci . The distribution of this demand
threshold is shown in Fig. S2(c). We observe a roughly
uniform distribution for all values of αci and a peak at
αci = 0 which corresponds to the case of cities served by
a single company. When these companies go bankrupt,
passengers have no other means to reach their destina-
tion (this is the case for approximately 300 companies).
We also observe a peak around αci ≈ 1 signaling the exis-
tence of very robust situation for which their bankruptcy
almost never lead to stranded passengers.
5III. THE EFFECT OF A LOWER DEMAND
AND CUSTOMER’S AIRLINE CHOICE
STRATEGIES
When the global demand decreases, we have assumed
so far that all segments and all companies are affected in
the same, uniform manner. This is, however, not true in
general, and we have to test various customer’s strate-
gies for choosing a company. A reduction in the global
demand can thus have different local consequences and
lead to very low passenger traffic demand for some com-
panies. These are obviously the companies that will be
the most at risk and it is the focus of this part to identify
them.
We first focus on one segment ` shared by multiple
companies. Before the crisis, each company has its ca-
pacity Ni(`) on this segment and the total number of
seats is N(`) =
∑
iNi(`). We assume that the global
demand is still described by α ∈ [0, 1] for all segments
(for further studies, we could assume some geographi-
cal dependence), the actual number of passengers on this
segment is αN(`). The question is then how we remove
the (1−α)N(`) passengers on this segment `, or equiva-
lently, how the remaining αN(`) passengers choose their
airlines. There are many factors influencing the decision
for choosing a specific airlines, including the frequency,
reliability, price, etc. (see for example the study [23]).
We decided here to focus on two main aspects: the ca-
pacity of an airline and its rank. A large capacity usually
goes together with a large frequency and reliability, and
for the rank we use the rank list of world’s top 100 Air-
lines 2019 provided by Skytrax [24].
We thus consider the following 6 strategies so that all
αN(`) passengers find their seats on the flights among
these companies: (i) The first ‘Uniform’ Strategy (UN)
used as a reference: Each company receives a number of
passengers proportional to its capacity. This random case
ignores all competitive avantage but provides a bench-
mark for assessing the effect of other strategies. (ii) The
‘Biggest First’ Strategy (BF): Passengers are assumed to
always give preference to the company with the largest
capacity (and then to the second largest one, etc.); (iii)
‘One-Uniform’ Strategy (1UN): Passengers are assumed
to choose first the company with the highest rank (pro-
vided by [24]). If no companies on the rank list operate
on this segment, a random company will be chosen first.
After flights of the first-choice company are fully occu-
pied, the other companies receive a number of passengers
proportional to their capacities; (iv) ‘One-Biggest First’
(1BF): Passengers are assumed to choose the company
with the highest rank first. If no companies on the rank
list are available for this segment, a random company will
be chosen. After flights of the first-choice company are
full, passengers give then their preference to the company
with the largest capacity; (v) ‘Rank-Uniform’ (RUN):
Passengers are assumed to choose companies according
to the rank list. If flights of companies on the list are oc-
cupied, the other companies receive a number of passen-
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Figure 5: Local effective demand for the ‘Biggest First’ strat-
egy. (a) Change of local effective demand for all companies
(we highlight the curves for the 23 companies that have gone
broke). The vertical red dotted line represents the estimated
value of global demand α = 36% in April 2020. (b) Distribu-
tion of local effective demand for α = 36%, 60% and 80%.
gers proportional to their capacities; (vi) ‘Rank-Biggest
First’ (RBF): Passengers are assumed to choose compa-
nies according to the rank list. If flights of companies on
the list are full, passengers give then their preference to
the company with the largest capacity.
Considering all the segments for each company i, for
a given strategy s and for a given value of α, we de-
note the actual number of passengers for company i by
Nsi (α). The local effective demand for company i (and
for strategy s) is then given by
Esi (α) =
Nsi (α)
Ni
. (4)
Companies with a large value of the local effective de-
mand will have enough passengers to function normally,
while those with a low local effective demand can be
considered at risk of bankruptcy. For the strategy of
‘Biggest First’, we show the change of local effective de-
mand for all companies (Fig. 5(a)), and its distribution
when α is equal to 36% (the estimated value of demand
in April 2020 according to IATA [25]), 60% and 80% in
Fig. 5(b). Even if most companies have a local effec-
tive demand around 36%, there are about 80 companies
without any passengers. For the 23 companies that went
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Figure 6: Comparison of local effective demand between 6
different strategies. (a) Average of local effective demand.
(b)Relative Dispersion of local effective demand. The vertical
gray dotted lines highlight α = 36%, 60% and 80%.
bankrupt so far, their local effective demand was in the
range [0%, 49%], consistently with the idea that a com-
pany with demand less than 50% is in financial danger.
In order to compare quantitatively these different
strategies, we show the local effective demand averaged
over all companies and its relative dispersion (equal to
the ratio of dispersion to average) in Fig. 6(a,b). For
the uniform case, where airlines are chosen completely
at random, the local effective demand of each company
is, as expected, identically equal to α (EUNi (α) ≡ α).
All other strategies produce important variations: from
Fig. 6(a) we can roughly estimate that for a demand of
36%, certain companies can experience a local reduction
of demand as low as about 30% or even less if we take into
account the dispersion which cannot be neglected (the
relative dispersion is always of order 1 - see Fig. 6(b)).
Even for a global demand of 60%, all these strategies
(except for the purely random case) predict that most
companies will experience a decrease of 50% or more of
their traffic. In order to highlight this local heterogeneity
effect, we plot in Fig. 7 the proportion of companies with
local effective demand less than 50% (We choose here
50% as this seems an already drastic reduction of the
demand that can be barely sustainable for most com-
panies. Results for other values of the local reduction
give similar results, see Fig. S4). Except for the uniform
strategy, Fig. 7 shows that for the current state of air
travel demand α = 36%, more than 90% of companies
will see an actual number of passengers less than half of
their capacity in the pre-crisis state. Even if the global
demand is back to 60%, then between 46% and 59% of
the companies will have an actual number of passengers
less than half of their capacity in the pre-crisis state. In
the unlikely event that it will go back in a near future
to 80%, we still see from 11% to 36% of companies with
half of their regular traffic.
IV. DISCUSSION
The results in this paper are twofold. First, the impact
on the WAN connectivity of an airline company failure
depends on its coupling with other companies. If the
company shares many segments with others, its failure
will more strongly affect the WAN structure. This shows
that the impact of a bankrupted airline cannot be dis-
cussed independently from the other companies, and that
it is necessary to take into account the whole structure
of the coupling between companies - which is encoded
in the ACN introduced here. Next, we showed that the
global demand reduction can hide large heterogeneities
in its impact at the airline level. More precisely, we have
found that, depending on the customer choice strategy,
the local reduction of demand can be extremely different
from its average value, in particular in the presence of
a competitive advantage. This shows that more compa-
nies than we can expect from a simple demand reduction
argument could be strongly affected by this crisis. In
the reasonable scenario where the global demand is back
to 60% of its total capacity, our analysis suggests that
roughly half of the companies will see their traffic divided
by two. These results need naturally to be enriched by
many other details about companies, but we believe that
they pave the way for constructing a robust tool allowing
us to understand and predict the future of the WAN.
V. MATERIAL AND METHODS
A. Data availability
The data that support the findings of this study were
purchased at OAG https://www.oag.com/.
B. Data
The Official Aviation Guide (OAG), one of the largest
global travel data providers, provides the detailed infor-
mation of every scheduled flight including the operating
airline company, origin/destination airport, aircraft type,
number of seats, departure date, etc.
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Figure 7: Proportion of companies with local effective demand
less than 50%. The vertical gray dotted lines highlight α =
36%, 60% and 80%.
We focus on the nonstop flights during the period
from 1st January to 25th April 2020 for understanding
the variation of global air traffic caused by COVID-19
and the corresponding period 1st January – 26th April
2019 for constructing the world airline network (WAN) in
‘normal state’. In the WAN, nodes represent cities and
links denote existence of direct flights. Considering all
the flights during 1st January to 26th April 2019, there
are n = 3, 713 cities serving as origins/destinations and
n` = 51, 306 different segments connecting these cities.
As the comparison, there are 3, 752 cities and 49, 215 seg-
ments during the period 1st January to 25th April 2020.
We define the weight of link as the everyday capacity
(number of seats) of flights between cities, i.e.,
wij =
1
T
T∑
t=1
Nij(t) +Nji(t)
2
, (5)
where Nij(t) is the total capacity of flights from city i to
city j on day t, and T = 116 is the length of time range.
[1] Maria Nicola, Zaid Alsafi, Catrin Sohrabi, Ahmed Ker-
wan, Ahmed Al-Jabir, Christos Iosifidis, Maliha Agha,
and Riaz Agha. The socio-economic implications of the
coronavirus pandemic (covid-19): A review. Interna-
tional Journal of Surgery (London, England), 78:185,
2020.
[2] Matteo Chinazzi, Jessica T Davis, Marco Ajelli, Corrado
Gioannini, Maria Litvinova, Stefano Merler, Ana Pas-
tore y Piontti, Kunpeng Mu, Luca Rossi, Kaiyuan Sun,
et al. The effect of travel restrictions on the spread of
the 2019 novel coronavirus (covid-19) outbreak. Science,
368(6489):395–400, 2020.
[3] Toyotaro Suzumura, Hiroki Kanezashi, Mishal Dholakia,
Euma Ishii, Sergio Alvarez Napagao, Raquel Pérez-
Arnal, and Dario Garcia-Gasulla. The impact of covid-
19 on flight networks. arXiv preprint arXiv:2006.02950,
2020.
[4] Lucy Budd, Steven Griggs, David Howarth, and Stephen
Ison. A fiasco of volcanic proportions? eyjafjallajökull
and the closure of european airspace. Mobilities, 6(1):31–
40, 2011.
[5] Peter Brooker. Fear in a handful of dust: aviation and
the icelandic volcano. Significance, 7(3):112–115, 2010.
[6] Jingyuan Wang, Ke Tang, Kai Feng, and Weifeng Lv.
High temperature and high humidity reduce the trans-
mission of covid-19. Available at SSRN 3551767, 2020.
[7] Boston Consulting Group. The post-covid-19
flight plan for airlines (accessed 2020-06-29).
https://www.bcg.com/fr-fr/publications/2020/
post-covid-airline-industry-strategy.aspx.
[8] Miquel Ros. The 2020 airline bankruptcy list is open (ac-
cessed 2020-06-29). https://allplane.tv/blog/2020/
1/17/airlines-that-stopped-flying-in-2020.
[9] David Slotnik. Some of the world’s airlines could
go bankrupt because of the covid-19 crisis, ac-
cording to an aviation consultancy (accessed 2020-
05-12). https://www.businessinsider.fr/us/
coronavirus-airlines-that-failed-bankrupt-covid19-pandemic-2020-3,
2020.
[10] Rupert Jones. Uk airlines call for multibillion bailout
to survive covid-19 crisis (accessed 2020-03-15).
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/15/
uk-airlines-call-for-multibillion-bailout-to-survive-covid-19-crisis,
2020.
[11] Karol Ciesluk. What causes an airline to go bankrupt?
(accessed 2020-04-26). https://simpleflying.com/
airline-bankruptcy/, 2020.
[12] Alain Barrat, Marc Barthelemy, Romualdo Pastor-
Satorras, and Alessandro Vespignani. The architecture of
complex weighted networks. Proceedings of the national
academy of sciences, 101(11):3747–3752, 2004.
[13] Roger Guimera, Stefano Mossa, Adrian Turtschi, and
LA Nunes Amaral. The worldwide air transportation net-
work: Anomalous centrality, community structure, and
cities’ global roles. Proceedings of the National Academy
of Sciences, 102(22):7794–7799, 2005.
[14] Massimiliano Zanin and Fabrizio Lillo. Modelling the air
transport with complex networks: A short review. The
European Physical Journal Special Topics, 215(1):5–21,
2013.
[15] Deborah L Bryan and Morton E O’kelly. Hub-and-spoke
networks in air transportation: an analytical review.
Journal of regional science, 39(2):275–295, 1999.
[16] Luca Dall’Asta, Alain Barrat, Marc Barthelemy, and
Alessandro Vespignani. Vulnerability of weighted net-
works. Journal of Statistical Mechanics: Theory and Ex-
periment, 2006(04):P04006, 2006.
[17] Oriol Lordan, Jose M Sallan, Pep Simo, and David
Gonzalez-Prieto. Robustness of the air transport net-
work. Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and
Transportation Review, 68:155–163, 2014.
[18] Trivik Verma, Nuno AM Araújo, and Hans J Herrmann.
Revealing the structure of the world airline network. Sci-
entific reports, 4(1):1–6, 2014.
8[19] Oriol Lordan, Jose M Sallan, and Pep Simo. Study of
the topology and robustness of airline route networks
from the complex network approach: a survey and re-
search agenda. Journal of Transport Geography, 37:112–
120, 2014.
[20] Stefano Boccaletti, Ginestra Bianconi, Regino Criado,
Charo I Del Genio, Jesús Gómez-Gardenes, Miguel Ro-
mance, Irene Sendina-Nadal, Zhen Wang, and Massim-
iliano Zanin. The structure and dynamics of multilayer
networks. Physics Reports, 544(1):1–122, 2014.
[21] Mikko Kivelä, Alex Arenas, Marc Barthelemy, James P
Gleeson, Yamir Moreno, and Mason A Porter. Multilayer
networks. Journal of complex networks, 2(3):203–271,
2014.
[22] Alessio Cardillo, Massimiliano Zanin, Jesús Gómez-
Gardenes, Miguel Romance, Alejandro J García del Amo,
and Stefano Boccaletti. Modeling the multi-layer na-
ture of the european air transport network: Resilience
and passengers re-scheduling under random failures. The
European Physical Journal Special Topics, 215(1):23–33,
2013.
[23] Sara Dolnicar, Klaus Grabler, Bettina Grün, and Anna
Kulnig. Key drivers of airline loyalty. Tourism Manage-
ment, 32(5):1020–1026, 2011.
[24] World’s top 100 airlines 2019 (accessed
2020/06/29). http:///www.worldairlineawards.
com/worlds-top-100-airlines-2019.
[25] After april passenger demand trough, first signals of
uptick (accessed 2020-06-29). https://www.iata.org/
en/pressroom/pr/2020-06-03-01/.
Appendix A: Segment overlap distribution
For the airline company network (ACN), we define the segment overlap between companies as
Oij =

∑
`∈Li∩Lj
min{Ni(`), Nj(`)}
min{Ni, Nj} i 6= j
0 i = j
(S1)
where Li is the set of segments operated by company i, Ni(`) is the capacity of company i on segment ` (averaged
over T = 116 days) and Ni =
∑
`∈Li Ni(`) is the total capacity of company i. This quantity captures the similarity
of segments operated by two different companies. The segment overlap Oij equal to 1 implies that either the set of
segments of one company is included in the set of the other one, or that they operate on exactly the same segments.
A value equal to 0 means that the corresponding companies operate over completely different sets of segments.
The distribution of segment overlap is shown in Fig. S1, and displays a wide range of values distributed in [0, 1].
We also observe that while the majority of the companies do not share any segments with each other (the highest
peak with segment overlap equal to 0), nearly 100 pairs of companies have an overlap equal to 1, meaning that they
operate over the same set of segments (or the set of segments of a company is included in the set of the other one),
indicating that these companies are in direct competition.
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Figure S1: Segment overlap distribution for all companies (shown in linlog).
Appendix B: Rerouting after bankruptcy
For a given value of the demand α ∈ [0, 1], we compute the effect of rerouting the passengers. In particular, we
estimate the additional distance experienced by all the rerouted passengers (the difference of distance between new
9and original routes), and count the number of stranded passengers.
For companies whose bankruptcy does not induce stranded passengers, we observe that passengers have to take
always more transfers and have to travel over longer distance with the increase of α. Fig. S2(a) shows the additional
distance travelers take in order to reach their destination. When α > 70%, passengers have to travel more than a
total of 1000 kilometers when transferring (results averaged over companies not inducing stranded passengers with
weight given by the capacity).
For companies whose bankruptcy leads to stranded passengers, the total number of stranded passengers (denoted
by Ns) is shown in Fig. S2(b). When α is of order of 0.5, there is a significative number of passengers stranded of
about 2.5 million. The exponent τ = 3.75 of the power law function fitting (Ns ∝ ατ ) indicates the rapid growth of
the number of stranded passengers with α.
In Fig. S2(c), we show the distribution of the critical demand threshold (for each company) above which there
is a non zero number of stranded passengers. The two peaks of the demand threshold in Fig. S2(c) correspond to
two extremal types of airline companies: Companies with αci ≈ 0 dominate the segments for at least one city and
its bankruptcy will cause the isolation of the corresponding cities, while companies with αci ≈ 1 have only a few
passengers and their passengers will never experience difficulties to be rerouted after their bankruptcy.
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Figure S2: Observations on passenger rerouting after airline company bankruptcy. (a) Weighted average cost of additional
distance with weight given by the capacity. (b) Total number Ns of stranded passengers as a function of α (the solid line
indicates a power law fit of the form Ns ∝ ατ where the exponent is here τ = 3.75). (c) Distribution of demand threshold.
Appendix C: Local Effective Demand
The local effective demand Esi (α) is defined as
Esi (α) =
Nsi (α)
Ni
, (S1)
where Nsi (α) represents the actual number of passengers for company i when passengers follow the airline choice
strategy s. Small values of this quantity allow us to identify companies at risk of bankruptcy.
We first show in Fig. S3, for the strategy of ‘Biggest First’, the distribution of the capacity of the airlines companies
with local effective demand less than 50% (computed for the global demand α = 36% which is the estimated value
10
of real demand in April 2020 by IATA). We see that even if most companies meeting this condition have a small
capacity, there are however a few large ones.
For each strategy, we compare the proportion of companies with local effective demand less than a value equal to
different thresholds 20%, 50% or 80% (Fig. S4). We observe a similar behavior for all these different thresholds. In
addition, for a given threshold, there is a critical point for α, below which the proportion of companies is above 50%.
In other words, for α less than this critical point, the proportion of companies with local effective demand less than
the threshold is larger than 50%, while for α larger than the critical point, the proportion of companies with local
effective demand less than the threshold is less than 50%. We show the value of the critical point of demand as a
function of the demand threshold and for different strategies in Fig. S5. We observe that this critical point is always
larger than the threshold, meaning that in general the local effective demand is always smaller than the global one.
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Figure S3: Distribution of capacity of companies with local effective demand less than 50% when α = 36%, the estimated value
of real demand in April 2020.
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Figure S4: Proportion of companies with local effective demand less than different threshold. For each strategy, three thresholds
are compared: 0.2, 0.5 and 0.8. (a) ‘Uniform’ strategy. (b) ‘Biggest First’ strategy. (c) ‘One-Uniform’ strategy. (d) ‘One-Biggest
First’ strategy. (e) ‘Rank-Uniform’ strategy. (f) ‘Rank-Biggest First’ strategy. The gray dotted lines highlight α = 36%, 60%
and 80%.
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Figure S5: Comparison of critical demand as the function of local effective demand threshold between different strategies.
